eople commonly want to be perceived as intelligent, as well as be liked by others. Previous research has demonstrated that people who wish to appear intelligent tend to criticise others, and that criticising others indeed leads to the perception of high intelligence. In the current research we hypothesised and found that this is not the case when (a) the criticism is targeted towards the people who form the impression, and (b) the criticism is targeted towards those with whom the people who form the impression have just interacted. In both cases, participants in our study liked evaluators less when they used criticism than when they used praise. Moreover, they perceived the evaluators as less intelligent. We also demonstrated that in cases of mixing praise with criticism, the sequence of the evaluation interacted with the target of the evaluation in influencing liking. We found a greater liking for evaluators whose evaluation changed from negative to positive rather than vice versa, but only when the perceiver was the target of the evaluation. The discussion centres on the potential underlying mechanisms for these results, as well as on the practical applications of the results and directions for future research.
Imagine a student who tries to look smart in the eyes of his professor by criticising the professor's arguments. While we can probably guess that the professor would not like this student, would the professor consider the student intelligent? And what if the student combines criticism with praise or instead of criticising the professor, criticises the professor's colleague?
People commonly want others to like them and perceive them as intelligent. They try to accomplish these goals by using various tactics of impression management for self-promotion and ingratiation (Leary, 1995) . Two of these commonly used tactics are criticising various objects and people in order to be perceived as intelligent (e.g., Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982) and praising others in order to be likeable (e.g., Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986) . This study investigates the effectiveness of these tactics for influencing others to like us and think we are intelligent when the target of the criticism and praise is the people forming the impression or a person with whom they interacted. We also examine whether, in the Correspondence should be addressed to Nurit Tal-Or, Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel. (E-mail: ntalor@com.haifa.ac.il).
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common situation of mixing criticism with praise, their sequence and target matters for the impression formed of the evaluator.
Criticism and praise as self-promotion strategies
The direct approach to appearing intelligent is by self-promotion. However, telling others how intelligent one is might lead to a perception of arrogance (Jones & Pittman, 1982) , and in many cases does not even advance the perception of intelligence (Godfrey et al., 1986) . Thus, people seek indirect ways to promote themselves, such as promoting people or organisations they are associated with or criticising others who are not related to them (Cialdini, 1989) .
Previous research shows that people who encounter others who are intellectually superior to them tend to criticise targeted individuals and their academic work, apparently to impress their interlocutors with their intellectual capabilities (Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982) . More recent research (Gibson & Oberlander, 2008) demonstrated that people who attempted to make another person perceive them as intelligent (as opposed to liking them and to a control group without a motive) not only tended to criticise more a targeted film, but also chose a disliked topic for discussion so they could critique it.
Thus, people tend to be critical of people and objects in order to appear intelligent. But does doing so actually make them look intelligent? While there is little research in this area, the evidence that does exist hints that the answer is yes. Amabile (1983) asked her participants to read positive and negative book reviews of a fictitious book by a fictitious author, and indeed the participants perceived the writer of the negative review as smarter. But would the same results emerge if the critique referred to the people forming the impression or a person with whom they had just interacted?
Previous studies have documented that people tend to like those with whom they interact or are going to interact (e.g., Vonk, 2002) . The interactions studied were mainly limited time discussions on topics assigned by the researchers (e.g., Tyler & Sears, 1977) . Thus, we assumed that following such interactions, the interlocutors would form a somewhat positive impression of one another. Moreover, when people criticise a person or an object about which we have a positive opinion, they are actually saying they disagree with our attitudes. As we know from the attraction paradigm, people tend to be drawn to those who agree with them (e.g., Byrne, 1997) . In addition, as Lydon, Jamieson, and Zanna (1988) established, we tend to appreciate intellectually those whose attitudes are similar to ours more than those whose attitudes differ from ours. Thus, people might feel that those who criticise their interlocutor (compared with those who praise their interlocutor) disagree with them, and thus perceive them as less intelligent.
Surely, this will also be the case when we are the targets of criticism, as we would most likely disagree with those who criticise us. Moreover, in that case a disagreement in attitudes is not the only factor involved. As we know from the well documented self-bias in attribution, people tend to attribute their failures to external causes (e.g., Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) . To preserve their self-esteem, people prefer to think that the evaluators who criticised them are incompetent rather than admitting that the evaluators might be competent and thus their critique is accurate.
The reverse might be expected with regard to the reaction to praise. Praising us or a person with whom we interacted and about whom we have somewhat positive feelings would actually mean stating attitudes that are similar to ours. As noted above, we tend to regard people who hold similar attitudes to us as more intelligent (Lydon et al., 1988) . To conclude, previous research showed that criticism leads to perceptions of intelligence (Amabile, 1983) . In these studies, however, the critique was not directed at the participants or people with whom they were familiar. Based on Lydon et al.'s findings and the self-bias in attribution, we predict that when an evaluator evaluates the individual or another person with whom the individual interacted, criticism will lead to a perception of less intelligence, whereas praise will have the opposite effect.
H1: An evaluator who criticizes will be perceived as less intelligent than an evaluator who praises. That result will stand regardless of whether the target of the evaluation is the perceiver or a person with whom he or she interacts.
Being perceived as intelligent is not the only perception people want to create. One of the most common motives for impression management is to be liked. However, it is quite clear from previous literature that while under some conditions criticism may be an effective method for being perceived as intelligent (e.g., Amabile, 1983) , criticising others is not an effective method of making others like us (e.g., Aronson & Linder, 1965) . To accomplish this goal, praise is much more effective (e.g., Vonk, 2002) .
Criticism, praise and perceived liking
It is well known to psychologists that people tend to like those who think positive things about them and those who evaluate them positively more than those who evaluate them negatively (e.g., Bourgeois & Leary, 2001 ). Interpersonal attraction models based on reinforcement theory are cited as the explanation for this finding. According to these models, the more we receive positive reinforcement from a person, the more we like him or her (Byrne, 1997) . Receiving praise as opposed to criticism feels good and accords with the motivation for self-enhancement. Thus, people tend to like those who evaluate them positively even when these evaluations do not correspond to their own perception of themselves (Vonk, 2002) .
Interestingly, this tendency to like positive evaluators is not restricted to the cases in which the evaluations are directed at the perceivers, but is also true in cases in which the evaluations are of someone or something else (e.g., Wyer, Budesheim, & Lambert, 1990) . A convincing example may be found in the series of studies conducted by Folkes and Sears (1977) . In an assortment of evaluated fields ranging from cafeteria workers to movies, cities and academic courses, the participants in these studies liked positive evaluators more than negative evaluators.
This tendency to like positive evaluators might stem from the simple association between the evaluation and the evaluator (Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005) . Alternatively, it might stem from the attributional process, according to which evaluators who tend to like others are themselves likable, whereas evaluators who dislike others are themselves unlikable (Gawronski & Walther, 2008) . When we agree with the positive evaluation, the liking of the evaluator might also stem from the similarity in attitudes, as mentioned above (Byrne, 1997) . In any case, we expect criticism to lead to less liking of the evaluator and praise to result in more liking.
H2: An evaluator who criticizes will be perceived as less likeable than an evaluator who praises. That result will stand regardless of whether the target of the evaluation is the perceiver or a person with whom he or she interacts.
But what happens when the same evaluator gives both positive and negative evaluations?
REACTIONS TO A COMBINATION OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS
People commonly combine positive and negative evaluations. Thus, they often express their positive evaluation first and later change it to a negative one, or vice versa. According to reinforcement theory (Byrne, 1969) , positive feelings about an evaluator are a function of the proportion of positive evaluations received from him or her. Thus, mixed evaluations should yield mixed feelings about the evaluator-less than consistently positive evaluations and more than consistently negative evaluations. This expectation also accords with the additive and averaging models of impression formation, according to which perceivers add the various information elements or average them to form an impression (Zebrowitz, 1990) . However, this expectation, deriving from reinforcement theory and from the additive and averaging models of impression formation, was refuted in a classic study conducted by Aronson and Linder (1965) . They showed that the sequence of evaluation items also matters. Their participants liked a person whose evaluation changed from negative to positive (NP) more than vice versa (PN). These findings were replicated in many other studies (e.g., Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; McAllister & Bregman, 1983) . In other words, the sequence of the evaluation had an influence beyond the total valence, in contrast to predictions derived from reinforcement theory. Aronson and Linder (1965) provided various possible explanations for these results. However, based on the accumulated body of research, it seems that the most plausible explanation is the recipient competence effect (Mettee & Aronson, 1974) . According to this explanation, perceivers like evaluators who change their evaluation from negative to positive, because this experience makes them feel competent and grateful to those who let them feel that way. However, they dislike evaluators who change their evaluations from positive to negative, because such a move frustrates them and makes them feel incompetent and responsible for this negative change. A more recent study documenting that a PN sequence of evaluations reduces the self-esteem of the target of the evaluation and makes the target sadder, angrier and more hurt than a NP sequence of evaluations supports this explanation (Buckley et al., 2004) .
Thus, according to this explanation, the targets attribute the change in the evaluations made by the evaluators to their own competence, not to that of the evaluators. Their liking of the evaluator stems from feeling grateful to the person who let them feel competent. Thus, we hypothesise that the sequence of the evaluation affects the liking of that person but should not lead to the perception that he or she is more intelligent. Moreover, the sense of competence that arises from changing an evaluation from negative to positive should occur only when the perceiver is the target of the evaluation. When the perceiver is an outside observer hearing an evaluation directed at someone else, he or she is not expected to feel competent or grateful to the evaluator who changed his or her evaluation from negative to positive.
H3: Evaluators who change their evaluation from negative to positive will be liked more than those who change their evaluation from positive to negative when the perceivers are the targets of the evaluation. When the perceivers are outside observers, there will be no difference in the liking of the evaluator, regardless of whether the change is from positive to negative or vice versa.
To examine these hypotheses, we compared the perceptions of PN, NP, all positive (PP) and all negative (NN) evaluators by a participant who was the target of the evaluation (similar to previous studies) and by an outside observer (which was not examined before).
METHOD Participants
The participants were 146 undergraduate students of a university in Israel. Of them, 15 were female and 131 were male. Their mean age was 25.08 years (SD = 2.95). The participants volunteered to participate in the experiment in exchange for 30 shekels (the equivalent of $8.00 at that time). 1
Design
We used a 4 (evaluation type: PP, NN, PN, NP) × 2 (evaluation target: the participant or his or her interlocutor) between subjects factorial design.
Procedure
We devised a lab situation in which an evaluation was provided to the participants about their own behaviour or the behaviour of someone else. We had to create a situation in which the participants' impression of the evaluator would be based only on this evaluation. Thus, we had to prevent any interaction between the participants and the evaluator, similar to Vonk's (2002) procedure. Therefore, following an interaction between the participants and a confederate, they received an evaluation of them or of the confederate from an evaluator with whom they had never interacted.
In addition, we had to make the condition in which the evaluation was of someone else similar to that in which the participants themselves were being evaluated. Vonk (2002) observed that previous actor-observer research confounded this manipulation by providing different information about the characteristics of the self and of others. While people know themselves and usually evaluate themselves highly, when they are not the targets of evaluation, they do not know the characteristics of the person being evaluated. Thus, based on Vonk (2002) we attempted to create a situation in which just as the participants witnessed their own behaviour in the condition in which they were being evaluated, they had to witness the behaviour of the other person who was being evaluated. Most importantly, we also wanted to create a situation in which the pre-existing perception about the other person being evaluated was positive. To meet all of these requirements, we used the following procedure.
Each of the participants was invited to come alone to the laboratory, where he or she met with a female research assistant (RA) and a male confederate pretending to be another participant who was blind to the experimental conditions. 2 After completing a questionnaire about their demographic details, the participant and the confederate were asked to conduct a 5-minute conversation regarding their favourite basketball or football teams. 3 The conversation was in the form of an interview in which either the confederate or the participant asked his or her interlocutor several questions provided by the RA such as their names and favorite teams, provided their own names and teams, and asked them to describe games in which one or two of these teams won. If the confederate was the interviewee, 2 Seven confederates participated in the research and were distributed among the various conditions. We repeated the two-way ANOVAs described in the findings section with the confederates' identity as a covariate (using dummy variables) and observed the same significant effects.
3 Only participants who identified themselves as basketball or football fans were recruited for this study, resulting in the greater proportion of male participants. 4 The conversations were part of different studies regarding the usage of impression management tactics and their effectiveness (see Tal-Or, 2010 ). We used them as the context for the evaluation manipulations in this study. We ensured that the manipulations used in those studies were not correlated with those of the current study, p > .1 5 To avoid social desirability issues, the participants were informed that to ensure the anonymity of their evaluation, the RAs would remain outside the room when they were filling out the form. They were given an envelope and told to put their completed form inside it and put that envelope inside a bag that was allegedly filled with envelopes of previous participants. 6 The ethics committee of the University approved the research.
he was instructed to always say the same text that was prepared beforehand and to keep his non-verbal behaviour as neutral as possible. This text included a simple description of the game including details such as the name of the competing team, the outcome of the game and who scored points. The conversations were video-recorded with the informed consent of the participants. 4 Based on previous studies documenting that people tend to be motivated to like the people they interact with or are going to interact with (e.g., Vonk, 2002) , we assumed that this situation would lead to a rather positive perception of the interlocutor. Following the conversation, the participant and the confederate were accompanied into separate rooms. The RA then read a letter to the participant from the leading researcher, who was allegedly concerned that the RAs' behaviour might interfere with the results of the research. Thus, she asked for the participant's sincere evaluation of the RAs. The researcher promised to take these evaluations into consideration when analysing the research results. Then, the participants were asked to form their opinion about two RAs: the one who conducted the experiment and another RA whom they did not see (and did not really exist), whose role, they were told, was to watch the conversations through a computer that was connected to the video camera and evaluate one of the partners in the conversation. 5 Since the participants did not see this RA, they were asked to form an opinion of the RA based on an evaluation report the RA allegedly wrote. In a random way, this evaluation was directed either at the participant or the confederate (who was the participant's conversation partner). This cover story enabled us to provide the participants with an evaluation and ask them to assess the evaluator without raising suspicions about the real goal of the experiment.
The evaluation report was designed to resemble the output of a computer program that encoded impressions at various times during the conversation. It included six evaluation items apparently formulated at different times during the conversation. The evaluation items referred to various traits and reflected either a positive or negative valence for each trait. 6 The positive and negative items were identically phrased and differed only in their valence. These evaluation items were all positive (PP), all negative (NN), changing from positive to negative (PN) or changing from negative to positive (NP). 7 The PP report included the following sentences: (a) his/her body language reflects comfort; (b) seems like a highly qualified person; (c) attentive to his or her conversation partner and creates a pleasant atmosphere; (d) his/her speech style reflects self-confidence; (e) seems like a very intelligent person; (f) pleasant and friendly, possesses very good interpersonal skills. The NN report was created from the same sentences with a negative valence. The PN report included the first three sentences of the PP report and the last three sentences of the NN report. The opposite was true for the NP report (i.e., the first three sentences of the NN report and the last three sentences of the PP report). The target of the evaluation report was clearly indicated at the top of the page as either the participants or their conversation partners.
After reading the evaluation report, the participants were asked to indicate their opinions of the evaluator on several 7-point scales. First, they were asked to rank their "gut feeling" towards the evaluator, and then to indicate to what degree they perceived him as fluent and having verbal expression ability, as intelligent and friendly. Furthermore, they were asked whether they thought they could have been friends with him and to what degree he was able to read people and form an accurate impression about them. Then the participants were asked to what degree they were generally sure of their answers about the evaluator on a 7-point scale ranging from "to a small extent" to "to a large extent." Lastly, the participants were asked to rate the evaluation itself on a 7-point scale ranging from positive to negative. Once the experiment was complete, each participant was probed for suspicion and then fully debriefed. The RA informed the participants about the need for the deception, apologised and thanked them for participating.
Measures
Following Gibson and Oberlander (2008) , we created two indices of perceived intelligence and liking of the evaluator. Perceived intelligence was calculated from the mean of the items measuring perceived intelligence and perceived fluency and ability of verbal expression (M = 4.72, SD = 1.32, r = .66, p < .001). Likeability was calculated from the mean of the items measuring the perceived friendliness of the evaluator and the degree to which the participants thought they could have been friends with him (M = 4.13, SD = 1.47, r = .76, p < .001. The correlation between these variables was r = 0.64 (p < .01) 7 The sentences in the report were chosen based on two pretests conducted on a population resembling that of the main study. These pretests revealed that the various evaluation reports used in the current study indeed reflected the valence and sequence they were intended to reflect.
RESULTS
To test H1, a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with type of evaluation (PP, NN, PN, NP) and target of evaluation (self or other) as independent variables, and perceived intelligence as a dependent variable. As H1 expected, this analysis revealed a main effect for evaluation type, F(3, 138) = 7.56, p < .001, η 2 p = .14. The most positive perception of intelligence formed was that of the PP evaluator (M = 5.57, SD = 0.90), followed by the NP evaluator (M = 4.56, SD = 1.35), the PN evaluator (M = 4.42, SD = 1.29) and finally the NN evaluator (M = 4.33, SD = 1.37). A Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that the PP condition significantly differed from all the other conditions (p < .01), which did not differ from one another (p > .1). As expected, there was no main effect of the target of the evaluation on perceived intelligence F(1, 138) = 0.15, p > .1, η 2 p = .001, nor an interactive effect of the target of the evaluation and evaluation type, F(3, 138) = 0.64, p > .1, η 2 p = .01. Thus, as H1 expected, participants assessed the consistently positive evaluator as more intelligent than the consistently negative evaluator.
To examine H2 and H3, a two-way ANOVA was conducted, with evaluation type (PP, NN, PN, NP) and target of evaluation (self or other) as independent variables, and liking for the evaluator as a dependent variable. As H2 predicted, this analysis revealed a main effect for evaluation type, F(3, 138) = 22.98, p < .001, η 2 p = .33. The participants liked the PP evaluator best (M = 5.39, SD = 0.97), followed by the NP evaluator (M = 4.38, SD = 1.12), the PN evaluator (M = 3.60, SD = 1.26) and finally the NN evaluator (M = 3.19, SD = 1.49). A Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all conditions significantly differed from one another (p < .05), except in the case of the PN and NN evaluators (p > .1). Thus, as H2 expected, participants liked the consistently positive evaluator more than the consistently negative evaluator.
There was no main effect of the target of the evaluation on liking, F(1, 138) = 0.09, p > .1, η 2 p = .001, but as H3 expected, there was a marginally significant interactive effect of the target of the evaluation and evaluation type, F(3, 138) = 2.53, p = .06, η 2 p = .05. In order to better understand the nature of the interaction, we examined the simple main effects of the evaluation type separately for the participants who received an evaluation of themselves and those who received an evaluation of another person. In the "self" condition there was a significant effect of the evaluation type F(3, 138) = 19.92, p < .01. The participants liked the PP evaluator best (M = 5.64, SD = 1.05), followed by the NP evaluator (M = 4.62, SD = 1.26), the PN evaluator (M = 3.40, SD = 1.38) and finally the NN In the condition in which the participants received an evaluation that was targeted at their interlocutor, there was also a significant effect of the type of evaluation, F(3, 138) = 5.72, p < .01. However, the means in the various conditions showed a different pattern. The evaluator was perceived significantly more positively in the consistently positive condition (M = 5.14, SD = 0.84) than in each of the other conditions (p < .01). However, the other conditions did not significantly differ from one another (NP, M = 4.16, SD = 0.96; PN, M = 3.82, SD = 1.12; NN, M = 3.59, SD = 1.28, p > .1; see Table 1 ). Thus, as H3 predicted, evaluators who changed their evaluation from negative to positive were liked more than those who changed their evaluation from positive to negative only when the perceivers were the targets of the evaluation, not when the target was another person.
DISCUSSION
Most of us want to appear intelligent to others and to be liked by others. Previous research has established that one of the tactics people use to appear intelligent is to criticise other people and objects (e.g., Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982) . Indeed, studies have shown that criticising others who are unknown to the target individuals does enhance perceptions of one's intelligence (Amabile, 1983) . On the other hand, we demonstrated that when the criticism is directed at the evaluator or a person with whom they interacted, they might not achieve their aim. In our study, evaluators who negatively evaluated the participants or the people they interacted with were perceived as less intelligent than those whose evaluation was positive. These findings add to the impression management literature in demonstrating how the effectiveness of criticising as an impression management tactic depends on the people to whom it refers. It joins another study demonstrating that point with regard to flattery (Vonk, 2002) .
Along with its contributions, our study suffers from a number of limitations that restrict our ability to determine the reasons for the findings and their generalizability. We did not measure the participants' level of agreement with the negative or positive evaluation, nor did we measure the perception of the interlocutor. 8 We also did not manipulate familiarity with the target of evaluation. Thus, while we speculated on the reasons underlying our results, we cannot be sure that the negative effect of the criticism on perceived intelligence stemmed from the fact that the participants were familiar with the target of evaluation and disagreed with the negative evaluation. To substantiate our explanation for our findings, future research should manipulate and measure these factors and examine their effect on perceived intelligence.
Another shortcoming involves the lack of a control group that received neutral feedback. We did not include that group, because we based our research design on that of Aronson and Linder (1965) . In retrospect, however, including such a group would have allowed us to pinpoint whether the effects found were mainly the reactions to the critique or to the praise. Moreover, the two RAs who ran the experiment were not blind to the experimental conditions. However, since they followed the same script in all of the experimental conditions, there was little room for bias. Furthermore, our research consisted of only one study with an unrepresentative population as a result of the oversampling of males. Interestingly, the classic research of Aronson and Linder (1965) studied females only and arrived at generally consistent findings. Similarly, the two-way ANOVAs we conducted revealed the same significant effects when we added the gender of the participants as a covariate. Still, future research should investigate the generalizability of our findings using a more representative population. Future studies might also examine the generalizability of our findings to different types of interactions and relationships among the three people involved: the participant, his or her interlocutor and the evaluator. For example, the evaluation of the evaluator might have been more similar in the conditions in which one is or is not the target of evaluation when the other person being evaluated is very close to him or her, such as a spouse. Finally, future research might explore whether impression managers take the target of criticism into account when deciding whether to use it to promote themselves.
In our examination of the effect of comments that contain a mixture of praise and criticism we found, as expected, that the sequence of the praise and criticism affects liking, but not perceived intelligence. Furthermore, this effect occurs only in cases in which the participants are the targets of the evaluation. Only when the evaluation was directed at the participant was the evaluator perceived more positively when the evaluation changed from negative to positive than vice versa. This pattern of results parallels those of previous studies that examined the reactions of people to evaluators who evaluated them, which showed that a NP evaluator is preferred over a PN evaluator (e.g., Buckley et al., 2004) . This finding also accords with Aronson and Linder's (1965) recipient competence effect. According to this explanation, changing the evaluation from negative to positive makes the recipients feel competent, because they succeeded in changing the evaluation in a positive direction. This satisfying result makes them perceive their evaluator more positively. These assumed feelings of satisfaction should not occur when the perceivers are outside observers.
These findings regarding the effect of mixing praise with criticism combined with the effects of praise and criticism per se contribute to the impression management literature. In particular, our findings help differentiate between the evaluation conditions that influence both perceived intelligence and liking and those that affect merely liking. Furthermore, they help differentiate between the evaluation conditions that affect the liking of the evaluator only when they are directed at the perceiver and those that have the same effect regardless of their target. Importantly, our study suggests that the effectiveness of the commonly used self-promotion tactic of criticising others might depend on the target of the criticism. This suggestion has a practical application for all of us who share our attitudes about other people and objects with others. We should keep in mind that negative evaluations, even if mixed with positive evaluations, can backfire, leading perceivers to dislike the evaluators and regard them as less intelligent. This is true not only when they deliver the evaluation to its target, but also when they share it with a third party. Ultimately, the common attempt to make oneself look better by being critical (e.g., Gibson & Oberlander, 2008 ) can prove destructive to one's self-presentation when the target of the criticism is the person forming the impression or a person with whom he or she interacted.
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